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Formal mathematics is a paragon of abstractness. It thus seems natural to assume that the mathematical expert
should rely more on symbolic or conceptual processes, and less on perception and action. We argue instead that
mathematical proficiency relies on perceptual systems that have been retrained to implement mathematical skills.
Specifically, we investigated whether the visual system—in particular, object-based attention—is retrained so that
parsing algebraic expressions and evaluating algebraic validity are accomplished by visual processing. Object-based
attention occurs when the visual system organizes the world into discrete objects, which then guide the
deployment of attention. One classic signature of object-based attention is better perceptual discrimination within,
rather than between, visual objects. The current study reports that object-based attention occurs not only for
simple shapes but also for symbolic mathematical elements within algebraic expressions—but only among
individuals who have mastered the hierarchical syntax of algebra. Moreover, among these individuals, increased
object-based attention within algebraic expressions is associated with a better ability to evaluate algebraic validity.
These results suggest that, in mastering the rules of algebra, people retrain their visual system to represent and
evaluate abstract mathematical structure. We thus argue that algebraic expertise involves the regimentation and
reuse of evolutionarily ancient perceptual processes. Our findings implicate the visual system as central to learning
and reasoning in mathematics, leading us to favor educational approaches to mathematics and related STEM fields
that encourage students to adapt, not abandon, their use of perception.
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and Action Systems (RUPAS)Significance
Teaching mathematical skills requires knowing how those
skills are actually accomplished by the mathematically
proficient. Traditionally, mathematical reasoning was as-
sumed to be divorced from perception and action; peda-
gogies have thus been devoted to helping students move
beyond “superficial” perceptual strategies. There is mount-
ing evidence, however, that mathematical skills actually
rely on our perceptual systems, retrained by experience to
implement abstract mathematical relations and transfor-
mations. The current study investigated one aspect of this
perceptual foundation: the use of object-based attention
to represent and evaluate hierarchical algebraic relations.* Correspondence: tyler.marghetis@gmail.com
Department of Psychological and Brain Sciences, Indiana University,
Bloomington, IN 47405-7007, USA
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the Creative Commons license, and indicate ifRather than teaching students to do mathematics the way
common sense suggests it should be done, this basic re-
search on how mathematics is actually accomplished
could inform the development of educational interven-
tions that treat trained-up perceptual systems as a proper
component of mathematical expertise.Background
Mathematical practice is undeniably perceptual. We read
equations, look at geometric diagrams, and inspect graphs.
In the canonical mathematical encounter, a mathematician
scribbles across a blackboard, writes equations and dia-
grams, and steps back to inspect their inscriptions. These
mathematical inscriptions must be seen to be used.1 How
should we make sense of all this perception within mathem-
atical activity? The standard account of mathematics—andis distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
rg/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
e appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to
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decidedly peripheral, even epiphenomenal. On this account,
the core feature of mathematics is its abstraction. The com-
petent mathematician, therefore, might use perception to
read equations or view diagrams, but should immediately
translate that perceptual information into more abstract,
perhaps symbolic, internal representations (e.g., Anderson,
2005). Perception and action are merely an interface be-
tween the environment and “real” mathematical thinking.
The more expert we become, the story goes, the less we
should rely on superficial visuospatial features (e.g., Kirshner,
1989). Mathematical reasoning should be divorced from the
vulgar details of perception and action.
There is certainly something to this account. An alge-
braic equation has the same meaning whether it is written
big or small, with red or black ink. Successful mathemat-
ical reasoning requires stripping away superficial, irrele-
vant details to access the underlying abstract structure.
There is a danger, however, of throwing out the perceptual
baby with the bathwater of irrelevant detail. There are
theoretical and empirical reasons to suppose that per-
ception and action lie at the core of mathematical expert-
ise. Mathematics is too recent a cultural development for
humans to have evolved mathematics-specific neural
resources. Human mathematical abilities will need to
rely on evolutionarily older capacities, recycled for new
purposes (Anderson, 2015; Dehaene & Cohen, 2007;
Landy, Allen, & Zednik, 2014). Could our perceptual sys-
tems be one of those recycled resources?
One context in which the visual system might perform
mathematical work is symbolic algebra. Algebraic notation
expresses relations that are both abstract and hierarchical,
but the notation itself relies heavily on visuospatial
features to represent those relations (e.g., Kirshner, 1989;
Whitehead, 1911). For instance, algebraic precedence is
associated with spatial proximity. While low-precedence
operations like addition require a full symbol (p + q),
multiplication requires only an abbreviated symbol (p•q)
or no symbol at all (pq). If the visual system were sensitive
to such regularities, then the hierarchical structure of
algebra could be read off directly from an expression’s
layout. And, indeed, people are sensitive to these visuo-
spatial norms. When they judge the validity of an algebraic
equation, performance is systematically worse if visual
grouping or proximity conflicts with operator precedence
(e.g., less space around addition than around multiplica-
tion), and systematically improved if visuospatial features
align with operator precedence (Landy & Goldstone,
2007a; Rivera & Garrigan, 2016). Conversely, when adults
write out algebraic expressions, they place terms connected
by a higher-precedence operation (e.g., multiplication)
closer together than those connected by a lower-precedence
operation (e.g., addition; Landy & Goldstone, 2007b). Thus,
mathematical notations are designed to tap into pre-existingperceptual biases, grouping related elements according to
Gestalt principles (Wagemans et al., 2012), and these design
choices have cognitive benefits.
The influence of this formally irrelevant visuospatial
information actually increases with competence and
experience (Braithwaite, Goldstone, van der Maas, &
Landy, 2016). This suggests that, over time, people
become increasingly sensitive to visual regularities in al-
gebraic notation, perhaps because they are relying more
on the notation’s visospatial layout to make algebraic
judgments. Mastering a notation’s visuospatial structure
allows us to transform symbolic, sequential reasoning of
the sort found in mathematics or logic into a series of
simpler perceptual tasks (Hutchins, 1995; Rumelhart,
Smolensky, McClelland, & Hinton, 1986). As Whitehead
(1911, p. 61) observed a century ago, “by the aid of
symbolism, we can make transitions in reasoning almost
mechanically by the eye, which otherwise would call into
play the higher faculties of the brain.”
A more radical possibility is that mathematical experience
might actually retrain our perceptual systems so that—in
addition to remaining sensitive to the visuospatial structure
of the notation itself—they also impose perceptual structure
onto mathematical representations (Goldstone, Landy, &
Son, 2010, Rumelhart et al., 1986). Done right, this would
transform symbolic mathematical relations into perceptual
structure. One way that our visual system might play this
role for algebra—where symbolic, hierarchical relations are
critical—is by imposing hierarchical structure on perceived
algebraic expressions.
Object-based attention in vision and reasoning
Our perceptual systems constantly construct and impose
structure upon the observed environment. The visual
system, for instance, imposes structure on sensory input
by organizing the visual world into discrete objects
(Wagemans et al., 2012). One facet of this structured,
hierarchical visual processing is object-based attention,
in which the visual world is organized into discrete
objects, and attending to one part or feature of an object
facilitates attention to the rest of the object (Kahneman
& Henik, 1981; Kimchi, Yeshurun, & Cohen-Savransky,
2007; Vecera & Farah, 1994). Object-based attention is
typically detected in experimental paradigms involving
visual property verification. People are better at com-
paring visual properties (e.g., color) when elements are
within a single visual object rather than distributed
between objects (Duncan, 1984; Fig. 1a).
The construction of visual objects does not depend ex-
clusively on sensory cues but is shaped also by experience-
dependent expectations. For instance, Zemel, Behrmann,
Mozer, and Bavelier (2002) had participants make a com-
parative judgment about features of objects in a visual
scene, but added an occluding object to make it ambiguous
Fig. 1 Object-based attention for perceptual and algebraic objects. a Visual property verification (e.g., same or different color?) is facilitated when
visual elements appear to belong to the same (top) rather than different (bottom) objects. b The syntax of algebra produces hierarchically organized
sub-expressions (illustrated by dotted rectangles). c Trials began with the presentation of an expression (left). On Color Verification trials (top right), two
adjacent variables were changed to either red or blue; participants decided whether the colors were the same or different. If the hierarchical structure
of algebra elicits object-based attention, verification should be facilitated within algebraic sub-expressions (e.g., c and f) rather than between them
(e.g., c and a). On Algebraic Equivalence trials, a second expression—created by permuting the original expression—appeared to the right, and partici-
pants decided whether the expressions were algebraically equivalent. Half the permutations produced expressions that were equivalent—for instance,
swapping variables separated by multiplication (middle right), which is both commutative and the higher-precedence operation. The other permutations
produced expressions that were not equivalent—for instance, swapping variables separated by addition (bottom right), the lower-precedence operation
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object or two separate objects. When participants had not
observed the unusual shape previously, their responses
were consistent with comparing features that belonged
unambiguously to separate objects. This suggests that, in
line with Gestalt principles, they had interpreted the two
parts as belonging to distinct objects. But when partici-
pants had previous experience with objects with that
unusual shape, they were faster to make the perceptual
judgment, as if now they interpreted the two features as
belonging to the same oddly shaped object. Thus, the
visual system constructs objects based not only on sensory
cues but also past perceptual experience.
Could mathematical expertise involve adapting object-
based attention to perform algebraic reasoning? The rules
of algebra—such as the rules governing operator preceden-
ce—impose a hierarchical structure that combines simple
elements into more complex expressions (Fig. 1b). For
instance, when constants and variables are multiplied
together, they act as a unified grouping within the larger
expression, known as a “term.” Individual terms are then
added, subtracted, or combined in other ways to create
even more complex expressions, much like words and
phrases are combined to form complex sentences.
Recognizing this hierarchical structure is critical to alge-
braic reasoning. When a complex algebraic expression is
manipulated, valid manipulations maintain algebraic sub-
expressions or act on them in systematic ways; invalid
manipulations violate or ignore sub-expressions (Fig. 1c).
For instance, given the expression ‘a • b + x • y,’ the rules ofalgebra license swapping the two algebraic sub-expressions,
‘x • y’ and ‘a • b,’ to get the new expression ‘x • y + a • b.’ By
contrast, one cannot swap the two adjacent variables ‘b’ and
‘x’ to get ‘a • x + b • y.’ This manipulation violates the prece-
dence rules for arithmetic operations. But to detect this
violation, it suffices to notice that it breaks apart the
two algebraic sub-expressions. Thus, if our visual
system were retrained so that—in addition to construct-
ing objects on the basis of sensory cues or experience-
based expectations—it also imposed visual objects that
were consistent with the requirements of formal
mathematics, then attending to these algebraic sub-
expressions would be one way for our perceptual
systems to accomplish aspects of algebraic reasoning
without recourse to abstract, symbolic mental represen-
tations. By perceiving algebraic elements that are closer
together in a hierarchical structure as a unified,
perceptual object, one could transform the conceptual
task of verifying algebraic validity into the perceptual
task of checking that transformations do not violate
algebraic objects.
Current study
To investigate whether people competent in algebra
impose perceptual objects on algebraic expressions, we
adapted the property verification paradigm used previ-
ously to demonstrate object-based attention (e.g., Baylis
& Driver, 1992; Zemel et al., 2002). Participants were
first evaluated for mastery of the basic rules that govern
the hierarchical structure of algebra (i.e., order of
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tention within algebraic expressions (e.g., w + a × c + f).
On each trial, two adjacent variables changed color, from
black to either blue or red, and participants had to deter-
mine whether these variables had the same color or dif-
ferent color. If visual objects are constructed based on
the expression’s hierarchical structure, then color verifi-
cation should be facilitated when performed within an
algebraic sub-expression (i.e., variables separated by
multiplication), compared to when performed between
sub-expressions (i.e., variables separated by addition).
Moreover, this within-object advantage should occur
only among those participants who have mastered the
rules that generate the hierarchical structure of algebra.
To investigate whether retraining the visual system mod-
ulates algebraic performance, we also tested participants
on a purely mathematical task: evaluating the algebraic
equivalence of two expressions. If, after participants
master the syntax of algebra, their visual system is
retrained to play a functional role in algebraic reasoning,
then object-based attention for algebraic sub-expressions
should improve performance in algebraic reasoning.
Methods
Following Simmons, Nelson, and Simonsohn (2012), we
declare that we report how we determined our sample
size, all data exclusions, all manipulations, and all mea-
sures. All experimental procedures were approved by the
university’s Institutional Review Board (0804000155).Participants
Volunteer adults (N = 150, Mage = 20 years; 73 men, 71
women, 6 other gender) participated online in return for
partial course credit. Sample size was determined in ad-
vance based on a pilot study (n = 30), using the same pro-
cedure as in the current study, which found object-based
attention within algebraic sub-expressions (p < .05), with
evidence for this effect only among participants who had
mastered the syntax of algebra (Bayes Factor BF10 < 1 for
participants who had not mastered algebraic syntax). Based
on the effect size of the interaction in this pilot (ηp
2 = .02), a
sample size of n = 135 would have a power of .95 to detect
the interaction between Algebraic Term and Syntax Know-
ledge (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007).
Materials
Expressions were displayed on a computer monitor in a
monospaced, sans-serif, black font. They consisted of
four variables separated by arithmetic operations, either
multiplication or addition (Fig. 1c). The symbol for
multiplication was created by rotating the addition
symbol by 45°. On each trial, variables were represented
by a random selection of unique letters from the Romanalphabet—excluding three letters that resemble numerals
(i, l, and o) and one that resembled the multiplication
symbol (x). Expressions had two possible formats: one
with multiplication in the center and additions on the
outside, and the other with addition in the center and
multiplications on the outside. This assured that both
arithmetic operations appeared equally in every position
within the expressions.
On Algebraic Equivalence trials, initial expressions
were joined by a rearranged version, which appeared to
the right of an equals sign (Fig. 1c; see Procedure,
below). Following Landy and Goldstone (2007a), this
second expression was created by applying one of eight
possible permutations to the first expression. Half of
these permutations produced expressions that were
equivalent algebraically to the original; the rest produced
expressions that were not equivalent (Fig. 1c).
Procedure
Participants were first evaluated for their knowledge of
the order of precedence for arithmetic operations (“Syntax
Knowledge”). Two arithmetic problems with both addition
and multiplication (e.g., 4 + 3 × 2 + 1) were followed by
four alternatives. One alternative was the correct solution,
obtained by performing multiplication before addition
(e.g., 11). Other alternatives included the solution obtained
if addition were performed before multiplication (e.g., 21)
and the solution obtained if operations were completed
from left to right (e.g., 15). Participants were considered
“Syntax Knowers” if they answered both questions
correctly, and “Non-Knowers” otherwise.
Participants then completed the main experimental
trials, which involved one of two tasks, assigned
randomly on each trial: Color Verification or Algebraic
Equivalence. All trials began with the presentation of an
algebraic expression, just left of the display’s midline.
The Color Verification task was modeled after the para-
digm used by Zemel et al. (2002) to study object-based
attention in a purely visual context. On Color Verifica-
tion trials, 3000 ms after the initial appearance of the
algebraic expression, two adjacent variables changed
color from black to blue or red (Fig. 1c). This cued
participants to determine whether the colored variables
were the same color (e.g., both red) or different colors
(e.g., one red, one blue). Color Verification trials were
used to measure object-based attention. On Algebraic
Equivalence trials, the presentation of the initial algebraic
expression was followed after 3000 ms by the appearance
of a second expression, separated from the first expression
by an equals sign (Fig. 1c). This cued participants to deter-
mine the algebraic equivalence of the left- and right-side
expressions. On both Algebraic Equivalence and Color
Verification trials, participants responded by pressing the
‘p’ (same/equivalent) or ‘q’ (different/non-equivalent) keys.
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accurately as possible; they had up to 10 s to respond, and
received immediate feedback after incorrect responses.
They completed 336 trials ordered randomly over four
blocks, each consisting of 12 Algebraic Equivalence and
72 Color Verification trials.
After completing the main experimental trials,
participants reported their age and gender, and
responded to a series of questions about their math-
ematical abilities: mathematics anxiety (from 1 to 10);
whether they had completed a college course on finite
mathematics (e.g., combinatorics); and their score on
the quantitative section of the SAT (which very few
participants remembered). No other measures were
collected.Analysis
For Color Verification trials, Signal Detection Theory
(Green & Swets, 1966) was used to analyze perceptual
sensitivity while controlling for potential response
biases. Pilot results indicated that the effect of object-
based attention, in this paradigm, was most pro-
nounced in perceptual sensitivity rather than reaction
time.2 After removing trials where participants did not
respond (<1%), discriminability (d’) was calculated for
each participant, Algebraic Term (within vs. between al-
gebraic sub-expressions), and Expression Format (either
“v1 + v2 × v3 + v4” or “v1 × v2 + v3 × v4”). Since many par-
ticipants had perfect discrimination in at least one con-
dition (n = 93), 0.25 was added to all cells of the signal
detection matrix to correct for infinite estimates of dis-
criminability (Brown & White, 2005). The main results
were confirmed by analyses of accuracy (see Appendix).
Analyses were conducted in the R software package
(Core Team, 2015). Hierarchical (i.e., mixed-effects)
models were fit with the lme4 package (Bates, Maechler,
Bolker, & Walker, 2015). All predictors were centered.
P-values for fixed effects were calculated using
Satterthwaite approximations (Kuznetsova, Brockhoff,
& Christensen, 2015). Participants were removed for
below-chance performance on Algebraic Equivalence
trials (n = 16) and for poor accuracy (<75%) on Color
Verification trials (n = 10). Including all participants
did not change the pattern or statistical significance
of the main results.Results
Accuracy was high on both tasks (Mcolor = 0.96, Mvalidity =
0.81).
Discriminability (d’) on Color Verification trials was
analyzed in a mixed ANOVA, with a between-subjects
factor of Syntax Knowledge (i.e., knower vs. non-knower),
and within-subjects factors of Expression Format (“v1 +v2 × v3 + v4” vs. “v1 × v2 + v3 × v4”) and Algebraic Term
(within vs. between algebraic sub-expressions). The only
effect that approached significance was the highly
significant interaction between Algebraic Term and
Syntax Knowledge, F(1,122) = 9.29, p = .003 (for all
others, p > .25. see Fig. 2). This medium-sized effect (ηp
2
= .07) was driven by two opposing simple effects. Syntax
Knowers (n = 78), who know that multiplication has
algebraic precedence over addition, had better percep-
tual discriminability within algebraic terms; that is, when
variables that changed color were separated by multipli-
cation rather than by addition, t77 = 2.1, p = .036, Cohen’s
d = 0.24. In other words, Syntax Knowers showed a sig-
nificant “within-object advantage” for algebraic sub-
expressions, in line with their knowledge of hierarchical
structure of algebra. By contrast, Syntax Non-Knowers (n
= 46) showed the opposite effect, with significantly better
discriminability when variables that changed color were
separated by addition, t45 =–2.2, p = .033, d =–0.33. Thus,
perceptual discriminability differed between and within
algebraic sub-expressions, modulated by participants’
knowledge of the hierarchical structure of algebra.
These results were confirmed by a linear mixed-effects
model, with fixed effects of Algebraic Term, Syntax
Knowledge, and their interaction; random effects of Sub-
ject and Expression Format; and the maximal converging
random effects structure, which had all random inter-
cepts and slopes, uncorrelated (Barr, Levy, Scheepers, &
Tily, 2013). Once again, there was a significant inter-
action between Algebraic Term and Syntax Knowledge
(b = 0.25, t = 2.7, p = .007), and this full model was
significantly better than a reduced model without the
interaction (χ(1) = 4.6, p = .03). No other effects were sig-
nificant (p > .85).
Relations to algebra performance
We next investigated whether object-based attention dur-
ing Color Verification trials predicted algebraic
performance. If mathematically competent undergradu-
ates rely on retrained object-based attention to parse
algebraic expressions, then participants who exhibited a
greater within-term advantage on Color Verification trials
should be better at determining algebraic equivalence. We
thus calculated, for each participant, a measure of object-
based attention on Color Verification trials, by subtracting
mean d’ on between-term comparisons, from mean d’ on
within-term comparisons. This measure is more positive
when discriminability is better for comparisons performed
within (vs. between) algebraic term.
First, we verified that Syntax Knowledge facilitated
performance on the Algebraic Equivalence task. As
expected, participants who had mastered the rules govern-
ing order of operations (i.e., Syntax Knowers) were better
at evaluating algebraic equivalence (M = 83.2% vs. 76.6%),
Fig. 2 Object-based attention for algebraic sub-expressions. Perceptual discriminability was modulated by whether perceptual comparison occurred
within an algebraic sub-expression (i.e., variables separated by multiplication) or between algebraic sub-expressions (i.e., variables separated by addition).
For Syntax Knowers, who exhibited mastery of the rules governing the hierarchical structure of algebra, discriminability was significantly better within
algebraic sub-expressions. By contrast, Non-Knowers showed the opposite effect: better discriminability when comparing variables that were separated
by lower-precedence addition. Error bars show SEM; *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01
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tax Knowledge made a unique contribution to algebra
performance, we analyzed trial-by-trial accuracy with a
mixed-logit model that included additional fixed effects
for available control measures: standardized mathematics
anxiety; whether participants had completed college finite
mathematics; and, to control for overall engagement, stan-
dardized mean accuracy on the Color Verification trials.3
The random effects structure was the maximal converging
structure motivated by the design, with random effects of
Subject and Equation Format, random intercepts, and all
random slopes (Barr et al., 2013). Both anxiety (β = –0.22
± 0.09 SEM, p = .016) and performance on Color Verifica-
tion trials (β = 0.42 ± 0.09 SEM, p < .001) were significant
predictors of accuracy on Algebraic Equivalence trials.
Even after controlling for these factors, however, Syntax
Knowledge still predicted algebra performance (b = 0.41 ±
0.20 SEM, p = .036).
We next investigated whether object-based attention
also facilitated judgments of algebraic equivalence. To the
full mixed-logit model of algebra accuracy, we added the
measure of participants’ object-based attention, its inter-
action with Syntax Knowledge, and all associated random
slopes. Once again, both anxiety and performance on
Color Verification trials predicted algebra performance(both p < .01), as did Syntax Knowledge (p = .045). The
only other significant predictor was the interaction be-
tween Syntax Knowledge and object-based attention (b =
1.2 ± 0.42 SEM, p = .006; Fig. 3). Follow-up subset analyses
found that, while Syntax Non-Knowers were overall worse
than Knowers at judging algebraic equivalence, their per-
formance was unrelated to their object-based attention (p
= .17). For the higher-performing Syntax Knowers, by
contrast, object-based attention was a highly significant
predictor of success in judging algebraic equivalence (b
= 0.68 ± 0.26 SEM, p < .01). Thus, there was evidence that
judging algebraic equivalence—a purely mathematical
task—was supported by object-based visual attention, but
only among those participants who had mastered the
basic hierarchical structure of algebra (i.e., Syntax
Knowers). Indeed, among Syntax Knowers, our measure
of object-based attention accounted for nearly 10% of the
variance in participants’ mean accuracy, even after con-
trolling for mathematics education, mathematics anxiety,
and overall task engagement.
Discussion
We investigated the hypothesis that the visual system is
retrained to perceive the hierarchical structure of
algebraic expressions, reducing high-level algebraic
Fig. 3 Object-based attention for algebraic sub-expressions predicts algebra performance. Participants’ within-object advantage in discriminability (horizontal
axis) was used as an index of object-based attention for algebraic sub-expressions. For Syntax Non-Knowers (right panel), object-based attention was unrelated
to algebra task accuracy (vertical axis). For Syntax Knowers (left panel), by contrast, algebra performance improved with increasing object-based attention. Dots
represent individuals. Black lines show lines of best fit that illustrate the relation between individuals’ within-object advantage and their mean accuracy on the
algebra task. Density plots show marginal densities for object-based attention (top) and accuracy on Algebraic Equivalence trials (right)
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participants who had mastered the hierarchical structure
of algebra exhibited object-based attention for algebraic
sub-expressions (i.e., variables around a higher-precedence
operation). In addition, the extent of their object-based
attention for algebraic sub-expressions predicted their per-
formance on a purely mathematical task, with performance
improving as object-based attention increased. This was
not the case for participants who had not yet mastered the
hierarchical structure of algebra; they did not exhibit
object-based attention for algebraic structure, and their
algebraic performance was unrelated to their perceptual
processing. Taken together, these results are consistent
with the hypothesis that mathematical expertise involves,
at least in part, recycling processes in the visual system to
create structured groups that honor the hierarchical struc-
ture of algebra.
Why, for some participants, was perceptual discrimin-
ability actually better between algebraic sub-expressions
than within? Most of these participants were Syntax
Non-Knowers. Some of these individuals may have the
order of precedence exactly wrong, solving addition
first—perhaps because it is easier—and only afterwards
moving to multiplication. Past studies have found that a
full third of college students struggle to apply the correct
order of operations (Pappanastos, Hall, & Honan, 2002;
see also Glidden, 2008). Perhaps more likely, the
addition symbol may attract attention for purely visual
reasons (e.g., it consists of lines that are vertical and
horizontal, rather than slanted) or because it is more
familiar, comfortable, and comprehensible, particularly
for lower-performing individuals. Indeed, extensive early
experience with addition may train the visual system toperceive sums as wholes, an early bias that must be
overridden by later algebraic training.
A between-object advantage, however, was found even
among some Syntax Knowers—including a few who
performed quite well on the Algebraic Equivalence task.
Some of this is presumably just noise; no behavioral
index of object-based attention is going to be a perfect
measure of perceptual processing. But this is also a good
reminder that there are multiple routes to mathematical
success. It is unlikely that every competent reasoner is
going to rely on the same visuospatial perceptual strat-
egy; some may even rely entirely on rote, explicit, lin-
guistically encoded knowledge of the order of operations
(e.g., recalling the abbreviation PEDMAS: Parentheses,
then Exponents, then Division and Multiplication, then
Addition and Subtraction). Object-based attention for
algebraic structure, therefore, may take time to develop,
emerging only after mastering algebraic syntax. For
some, perceptual processes may always be overshadowed
by complementary strategies.
Previous work has demonstrated object-based attention
for concrete objects inferred from sensory cues (Duncan,
1984) and expectations that reflect past perceptual experi-
ence (Zemel et al., 2002). The current study extended this
phenomenon to objects established on the basis of abstract
relations and conceptual knowledge. In some ways, this is
reminiscent of the holistic perception of written words
(Ehri, 2005). Skillful readers retrain their visual system so
they see written words as wholes, not collections of individ-
ual letters. Holistic word perception, however, still depends
primarily on a sensory cue—the space between words—or
past exposure to that particular word-form. This is some-
times true for algebraic notation, too, where algebraic
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ever, the hierarchical structure of an expression is not read-
ily apparent from visual inspection alone. In the current
study, for instance, addition and multiplication were spaced
equally, minimizing any sensory cues indicating which vari-
ables belong together. Furthermore, during reading, only
specific combinations of letters form legitimate words. In
algebra, by contrast, new variables can be combined pro-
ductively to create novel sub-expressions; indeed, in the
current study, letters were chosen randomly from the al-
phabet, generating combinations that participants may have
never before encountered. Despite this productive novelty,
algebraic sub-expressions were perceived as unified visual
objects. These visual objects could only have been con-
structed on the basis of the formal rules governing algebraic
syntax. Basic perception was reshaped by high-level con-
ceptual knowledge.
The nature of mathematical expertise
The current results suggest that relying on visual processing
might be a boon, not a barrier, to mathematical reasoning.
This might come as a surprise. Confronted with evidence
of students’ reliance on misleading, superficial visual strat-
egies in algebra, some have argued that mathematical train-
ing should avoid and even suppress perceptual strategies
(e.g., Kirshner, 1989; Kirshner & Awtry, 2004). For example,
when asked to solve 4 + 4/2 + 2, some students might be
led to answer “2,” incorrectly, because of the superficially
tempting, perceptually strong 4 + 4 and 2 + 2 groups. In-
deed, we sometimes found evidence for perceptual group-
ing around addition, rather than multiplication, particularly
among participants who had yet to master the hierarchical
syntax of algebra. But the fact that novices use perceptual
strategies to arrive at incorrect answers does not imply that
experts abandon such strategies entirely. Instead, experts
may refine those perceptual strategies so that they become
reliable, robust, and rapid routes to correct solutions (Gold-
stone et al., 2010; cf., Hutchins, 1995, and Rumelhart et al.,
1986). In line with this, participants who had mastered the
hierarchical syntax of algebra also exhibited object-based at-
tention for algebraic sub-expressions. Mathematical expert-
ise, therefore, might be better thought of as the skillful
deployment of perception.
Thus, the mathematical expert is made more expert,
on the one hand, by mastering clever notations in which
conceptual relations are presented perceptually and, on
the other, by retraining their visual system to perform
some aspects of algebraic reasoning. Both this perspec-
tive on mathematical practice and its resistance have a
long heritage. To quote Whitehead (1911, p. 61) yet
again: “It is a profoundly erroneous truism, repeated by
all copy-books and by eminent people when they are
making speeches, that we should cultivate the habit of
thinking what we are doing. The precise opposite is thecase. Civilization advances by extending the number of
important operations which we can perform without
thinking about them.” The resistance continues to this
day. New Mathematics was a relatively recent, and
particularly controversial, movement in education that
attempted to foreground the “important operations” of
mathematics, at the expense of procedural mastery
(Adler, 1972). But one implication of our perspective is
that mathematical training might be better spent
encouraging students to adapt—not abandon—their per-
ceptual grouping processes. Instead of minimizing stu-
dents’ reliance on perceptual strategies (Kirshner, 1989;
Kirshner & Awtry, 2004), education should aim to refine
students’ use of perception and action, so that they rig
up their perception and action systems like mathemat-
ical experts. This could take the form of explicit ins-
truction on how the visuospatial layout of algebraic
equations contains hints to the hierarchical relations that
they represent. Additionally, future curricula or tools
could intervene in targeted ways on the embodied
routines that contribute to mathematical expertise,
taking advantage of decades of research on perceptual
and motor learning (Ottmar & Landy, in press).
Regardless of what we do as teachers, children pick up
on the perceptual regularities of their environments,
implicitly developing perceptual associations and rou-
tines. These can become obstacles, such as when chil-
dren interpret the visual form of the equals sign as a cue
to calculate, hindering learning in early algebra (McNeil,
2008). But they can also offer long-term benefits, such
as the perceptual strategy documented in the current
study. We imagine a future where computer-based tools
will systematically manipulate the visual and interactive
features of mathematical representations so that children
pick up on the perceptual regularities that help, rather
than hurt (e.g., Weitnauer, Landy, & Ottmar, 2016).
Of course, perception alone is insufficient to account
for all of mathematical reasoning. However, we suspect
it is a critical part of the larger, distributed system that
accomplishes mathematics, a system in which resources
within the skull are brought into coordination with
resources outside (e.g., gestures, inscriptions), skillfully
soft-assembled to respond to the situated demands of
the task (Clark, 2008). These sundry resources are often
“embodied,” from neural circuits that evolved for per-
ceiving and acting, to the fleshy hands that do the literal
“manual labor” of mathematics (Marghetis, Edwards, &
Núñez, 2014). For example, brain circuits that evolved
for perceiving motion or shifting attention are rede-
ployed to support mathematical skills like symbolic
arithmetic, where attention is shifted along a simulated
number-line (Knops, Thirion, Hubbard, Michel, &
Dehaene, 2009; Marghetis, Núñez, & Bergen, 2014;
McCrink, Dehaene, & Dehaene-Lambertz, 2007), or
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across the equals sign (Goldstone et al., 2010). Our
bodies, too, are disciplined by mathematical training.
When a mathematical expression is examined, eye move-
ments respect the expression’s hierarchical structure, start-
ing with the highest-precedence operation and moving
sequentially to gradually lower-precedence operations
(Landy, Jones, & Goldstone, 2008; Schneider, Maruyama,
Dehaene, & Sigman, 2012). And while gestures can shape
children’s early mathematical knowledge (Goldin-Meadow,
Cook, & Mitchell, 2009), even experts gesture spontan-
eously to express their mathematical understanding
(Marghetis & Núñez, 2013). A complete understanding of
mathematical cognition requires that we study mathematics
as it is actually accomplished, as an embodied practice: eyes
darting across the blackboard, hands scribbling away.
The widespread role of regimented perception
While the current study has focused on retraining our
perceptual apparatus to perform algebraic reasoning,
mathematics is full of other practices that also likely de-
pend on the regimentation of perception. Visual proofs
in Euclidean geometry are unreliable when treated
naively as exact depictions, but the expert geometer
learns to ignore those diagrammatic features that could
lead to invalid conclusions (e.g., exact length) while
perceiving those features that can make valid contribu-
tions to a proof (e.g., containment; Manders, 2008). And
this is not restricted to high school mathematics.
Category Theory, a branch of modern mathematics,
relies on a proof technique known as “diagram chasing”
that relies entirely on the creation and interpretation of
diagrams in which spatial locations indicate mathemat-
ical relations. Indeed, visuospatial ability is significantly
greater among professional mathematicians compared to
non-mathematicians, and it completely mediates the
relation between basic numerical abilities and the attain-
ment of advanced mathematical expertise (Sella, Sader,
Lolliot, & Cohen Kadosh, 2016). Thus, while algebra has
been our case study, we propose that mathematics more
generally depends for its accomplishment on the cultural
regimentation of our perceptual apparatus.
And this may be an even more general phenomenon,
with regimented perception playing a role in the
reproduction of many, if not most, sociocultural systems.
Biases in face perception, for instance, may contribute to
the reproduction of structural racism: implicit racial
biases, which shape the perception of facial emotions
(Hugenberg & Bodenhausen, 2003), can influence
split-second decisions by law enforcement about
whether or not to shoot a suspect (Correll, Park, Judd, &
Wittenbrink, 2007), thus reproducing structural in-
equalities in safety and policing. Marx even argued that
a similar process of regimented perception contributesto the reproduction of capitalist society as a whole, such
that we learn to see the world in terms of objects to be
owned (Marx, 2012). Thus, the cultivation of highly
disciplined ways of seeing and acting may be a critical
mechanism by which we reproduce immense sociocul-
tural systems (Bourdieu, 1977), from structural inequal-
ity to the inferential structure of mathematics.
Conclusions
Let us return to the puzzle with which we began: why is
mathematical practice so thoroughly perceptual? Our
answer is that the mathematical expert need not abandon a
reliance on perception. Perception is not an obstacle to ab-
straction. On the contrary, culturally regimented perception
is the engine of expert mathematical reasoning. In particu-
lar, high-level algebraic reasoning is accomplished by basic
perceptual processes that are adapted to reflect abstract
conceptual knowledge. Difficult conceptual tasks are thus
transformed into robust perceptual ones. This exemplifies a
strategy that recurs throughout human cognition: percep-
tion and action are rigged up so that “the senses have there-
fore become directly in their practice theoreticians” (Marx,
2012, p. 107).
Endnotes
1Or, for blind mathematicians, they must be touched.
2Exploratory analyses of the current study, suggested by
reviewers, hints at one possible explanation for this: Syn-
tax Knowers’ reaction times were less variable, p = .01.
Thus, any evidence of object-based attention in reaction
times would have been compressed in exactly that subset
of participants who were predicted to show the largest
effect. There was no such compression in discriminability.
3SAT scores were not included because so few partici-
pants (<25%) reported their score.
Appendix
Confirmatory analyses of accuracy
In addition to analyzing discriminability, which controls
for any response bias, we also further confirmed all main
findings with analyses of accuracy. Accuracy on Property
Verification trials was analyzed with a mixed-logit
model, with fixed effects of Algebraic Object, Syntax
Knowledge, and their interaction; random effects of
Subject, Equation Format, and Comparison Location
(first, second, or third location with the expression); and
the maximal converging random effects structure, which
had all random intercepts and slopes, uncorrelated. The
only significant effect was once again the interaction be-
tween Algebraic Object and Syntax Knowledge (b = 0.51,
z = 2.1, p = .03). Follow-up subset analyses revealed that
Syntax Knowers were significantly more likely to be cor-
rect if they were judging colors within a multiplication
object (M = 97% vs. 96%; b = 0.19, z = 2.16, p = .03).
Marghetis et al. Cognitive Research: Principles and Implications  (2016) 1:25 Page 10 of 10Syntax Non-Knowers, by contrast, were marginally more
likely to be correct within an addition object (M = 97%
vs. 96%; b = –0.30, z = –1.89, p = .06).
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